College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

1993

'Death and Taxes' and Hypocrisy
John W. Lee
William & Mary Law School, jwleex@wm.edu

Repository Citation
Lee, John W., "'Death and Taxes' and Hypocrisy" (1993). Faculty Publications. 1377.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1377

Copyright c 1993 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs

Faculty and Deans

'DEATH AND TAXES'
AND HYPOCRISY
by John Lee

John Lee is a professor of law at the Ma.r~hall-. ,'
Wythe School of Law, CoUegeof William & Mary, .
Williamsburg, Virginia. Tax Not,~~;l~j,~h~M!?j~ei~.!ni
Professor Marjorie E. Kornhati;;;,er:· q~ j ep:¢:;;;r1fllm~.r+I
. School, who
.
.'
itfed',:tnEi"or"""iw');'t'ver;
Y>
Law
also subm
.
. 'KL!f!t"""""Yi.+'

.~;'~¥l!i~~~:~i~l~~~~~~tJI~lili i

a 19205 populist attack on TreasurySecretafrMel:;. ..
Ion for cutting taxes ,~:m. the.l'kh· ~..t~~J~~.m~ of
trickle-down economIcs whIle relymg!Q;t;\;it.¢ gressive excise taxes on the ' masses ~:~ml:t~ll:,:;.aLt.tack
sim~lar to ' that wage~ by ~en-Gov~~#9~:~pnto~.,,,
dunng the 1992 preSIdential campalgn: fF\jfthe~~,;L'
says Lee, the Bush administrationdi$playedm.o~t;,:
of a preference for regressive excise taxesth~n;;tJ;i:~;i::iii
Clinton plan, whosereliance.4l pc,\rt on consuttiR+ ':i:
tiontaxes' appears a consequence of 25 yeatsof"-:;:
Republican "tax revolt" rhetoric.
. ' . ....~'Y:u
.

,,

'

......

I. Introduction
The intended implication of the "death and taxes"
poem published by Rep. Thomas Ewing (R-Ill.) in the
June 30,1993, Congressional Record, and reprinted in Tax
Notes Guly 12, 1993, p. 235), is that the Clinton tax plan
is aimed at the common person largely through consumption taxes. Rep. Ewing states in the Congressional
Record that, in response to a survey, he received the
poem from one constituent "expressing their [sic] concern about the Clinton tax package," 139 Congo Rec. H
4281 (House, June 3D, 1993, Daily Ed.). This is rich,
albeit probably unintended, irony. First, the ultimate
inspiration of Rep. Ewing's doggerel is the pop~list
"Mellon ditty" published in the 1924 CongressIOnal
Record, where it fit much more aptly the tax plan of
Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon, under
whom, the joke ran, three Republican presidents
served, than the watered-down Ewing piece applies to
the Clinton tax plan. Part of Mellon's tax plan in 1924
was to reduce progressivity still further by cutting the
top ordinary rate a second time; Clinton's tax plan, in
contrast, would restore further some of the progressivity
lost in the Mellon-like ordinary and capital gains cuts
of 1981. The Ewing poem, of course, omits the populist
anti-rich elements of the original. l Second, the common
thematic element to both ditties is a heavy use of consumption taxes, which in recent political debate has
been more preferred by Republican administrations
than the Clinton administration. Third, the Clinton tax
plan's reliance in part on consumption taxes, such as
energy taxes, appears in large part politically responsive to the Republicans' use over the past 25 years of
tax revolt rhetoric.
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165 Congo Rec. (Part 3) 3031-32 (House Feb. 23, 1924)
(Remarks of Rep. William Lankford, D-Ga.). He introduced
the "Mellon ditty" as follows: "We find the Secretary of the
Treasury at one time advocating a sales tax, at another suggesting three cents postage on ordinary letters, and a tax on
all checks drawn on banks regardless of their size. At all times
we find him urging less taxes for the millionaire profiteer and
more for the common folks. So it is most evident that his plan
is to tax more and more the poor and to finally relieve entirely
the very rich." For identical, contemporaneous sentiments by
other members of Congress, see notes 10 and 40 infra.
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II. Populist Origins of the Mellon Ditty
While most workers were exempted from the federal
income tax from the early 1920s to the early 1940s due
to generous personal exemptions,2 they were instead
regressively and heavily burdened by excise taxes. This
pattern of (regressive) consumption taxes as well as
Mellon's cha mpioning furth er cu ts in the top individual rates after he had already gutted real progressivi ty by extensive preferences prompted the "Mellon
ditty. "3
The real Mellon plan is summed up in the following:
Tax the people, tax with care,
Tax to help the millionaire;
Tax the farmer; tax his fowl;
Tax the dog and tax his howl;
Tax his hen and tax her egg;
And let the bloomin' mudsill b eg.
Tax them just all you can,
This is, friends, the Mellon plan.

20nly 2.5 million individuals paid federal income taxes in
1925 out of perhaps 30 million workers. See Kornhauser, "The
Origins of Capital Gains Taxation: What's Law Got to Do With
It?" 39 SW L.J. 869, 873 n. 18 (1985). The $2,000 personal
exemption for married taxpayers was worth over $15,600 in
1990 dollars.
During this entire period, the individual income tax
applied to a small fraction of the population, and only
a small fraction of income was subject to tax. Between
1918 and 1920, taxable individual income tax returns
covered an average of 9.5 percent of the U .S. population. Between 1921 and 1929, the comparable figure
was 5.2 percent of the population. Similarly, in 1918,
taxable income was only 13 percent of personal income;
in 1926, taxable income was only 14 percent of personal
income. Furthermore, most taxpayers had - by
today's standards - very low incomes. In 1920, 7.3
million returns were filed . Returns with less than
$2,000 of income represented 37 percent of all returns
and included 17 percent of income. Returns with incomes of less than $3,000 represented 72 percent of
total retums and 43 percent of income. Finally, 91 percent of returns (with 64 percent of income) had incomes
below $5,000. The top rate of 77 percent applied to
taxable income over $1 million . There were only about
30 such returns.
Treasury Office of Tax Analysis, Report to the Congress on the
Capital Gains Tax Reductions of 197849 n. 14 (Sept. 1985). For
a breakdown of personal income by sources and income classes
(and numbers of taxpayers in each class) for 1921, see Hearings
on H.R. 6715 (Revenue Act of 1924) before the Senate Finance
Committee, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 304-06 (1924) (Tables submitted by Sen. Andrieus Jones, D-N.M.), reprinted in 2 Reams,
The Internal Revenue Acts of the United States 1909-1950: Legislative Histories, Law and Administrative Documents (William H.
Hein & Co. 1979) (1909-1950 Legislative Histories).
365 Congo Rec. (Part 3) 3031-32 (House Feb. 23, 1924)
(Remarks of Rep. Lankford, D-Ga.) (Emphasis added to highlight the most direct "lifts" in Ewing poem).
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Tax his pig and tax his squeal,
Tax his boots, run down at heel ;
Tax his horses, tax his lands,
Tax his blisters on his hands;
Tax him just all you can;
This is, friends, the Mellon plan.
Tax his plow and tax hi s clothes,
Tax his rag that wipes his nose;
Tax his house and tax his bed,
Tax the bald spot on his head;
Tax the ox and tax the ass;
Tax his "Henry," tax the gas;
Tax the road that he must pass
And make him travel o'er the grass;
Tax him just all you can;
This is, friends, the Mellon plan .
Tax his cow and tax the calf,
Tax him if he dares to laugh;
He is but a common man,
So tax the cuss just all you can,
This is, friends, the Mellon plan.
Tax
Tax
Tax
Tax
Tax
Tax

the lab'rer, but be discreet,
him for walking on the s treet;
his bread and tax his meat,
his shoes clear off his feet .
the pay roll, tax the sale,
all his hard-earned paper kale;

Tax his pipe and tax his smoke,
Teach him government is no joke;
Tax him just a ll you can,
This is, friends , the Mellon plan .

Tax their coffins, tax their shrouds,
Ta x thei r souls beyond the clouds;
Tax "small" business, tax the s hop;
Tax their incomes, tax their s tocks;
Tax the living, tax the dead;
Tax the unborn before they're fed;
Tax the water, tax the air,
Tax the sunlight if you dare;
Tax them all, tax them well,
Take it a ll, don't leave a smell ;
Tax the good roads, tax the s tones,
Tax the farmers, tax their loans,
Kill their credit, raise th e ir rates,
Tax the cities, tax the States;
Save the profiteer his gold ,
Tax the poor, tax the old;
Tax the m jus t all you can,
This is, friends, the Mellon plan.

III. 'Symbolic' Progressivity in the 1920s and 1930s
Ogden Mills, who had been a Wall Street tax lawyer,
a member of the House Ways and Means Committee
in the ea rly 1920s, and President H oover's last Secretary of Treasury, pointed out in the 1932 S nate Finance
Committee Hearings that the real tax burd e n was sta te
and local taxes, which were borne by low - and
TAX NOTES, September 6, 1993
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moderate-income taxpayers. 4 The federal individual
income tax was, until the Revenue Act of 1942, only a
token "class" tax on the rich and well-to-d o. 5 Secretary
Mellon already had achieved a reduction in the top
individual rate from 77 to 58 percent in the Revenue
Act of 1921, and was in the process of persuading
Congress to cut the top rate further as it did in 1924
and 1926, ultimately down to 25 percent. 6 But even
these reduced nominal top individual income tax rates
did not tell the fu ll story. During the boom year of 1925,
almost 50 percent of the individual income covered by
the "class" income tax was long-term (two-year or
longer holding period) capita l gains (85-percent public
stock), subject to a flat tax of 12.5 percen t,? earlier introduced by Mellon. The top 10,000 individuals in income, who garnered over 90 percent of the benefits of
this preference,8 paid half of the individual income
taxes.9 And the capital gains preference was just one
of many Mellon introduced in the Revenue Act of 1921

4Hearings on the Revenlle Act of 1932 before the Senate Finance
Com mittee, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932) (Secretary Ogden
Mills), reprinted in 101909-1950 Legislative Histories. This pattern continued under President Franklin Roosevelt, notwithstanding soak-the-rich rhetoric after his first term (apparently to head off Huey Long's populist income tax
proposals). Due to continuation of the broad personal exemptions, the federal income tax remained a tax only on higherincome taxpayers, who maintained low effective rates through
the capital gains preference, while the masses remained subject to regressive excise taxes. In short only" symbolic reform"
was affected by FDR income tax changes. Cf. Leff, The Limits
of Symbolic Reform 2-3, 288-93 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1984)
("symbolism" consists of using "political enemies" in political
discourse, such as "economic royalists," which deflects and
reassur~s reformists, or at least the populace, thereby undermining reform efforts). Roosevelt espoused soak-the-rich income tax policies, but regressive excise taxes raised even more
revenues compared to income tax returns during the New
Deal era than in the 19205 or late 1940s. ld.
5Jones, "Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda
in the Expansion of the Income Tax During World War II,"
37 Buffalo L. Rev. 685, 686 (1988) (increase from seven million
taxpayers in 1940 to 45 million in 1945).
6The Revenue Act of 1921 reduced the maximum rate from
73 to 58 percent. Pub. Law 67-98, section 210 (normal tax of
8 percent) and section 211 (maxim um surtax of 50 percent on
net income over $200,000), 42 Stat. 227, 233, 237. Mellon
directed further reductions in the Revenue Act of 1924, and
the Revenue Act of 1926 reduced the top rate to 25 percent.
Pub. Law 69-20, sections 210 (maximum normal rate of 5
percent) and 211 (maximum surtax of 20 percent of net income in excess of $100,000),44 Stat. 9, 21 -23.
7Report of a Subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and
Means, Proposed Revision of the Revenue LAws, 1938, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. 90 (1938) (Vinson Report), reprinted in 103 1909-1950
Legislative Histories .
BThose with $100,000 or more in annual income ($730,000
in 1990 dollars) . Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, Supplemental Report on Capita l Gains and Losses, Vol. 1,
Part 7, p. 5 (1929), reprinted in 117 1909-1950 Legislative Histories.
9Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1938, before the House Committee on Ways & Means, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 116-21 (1938)
(Treasury Exhibits), reprinted in 211909-1950 Legislative Histories.
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to reduce the burden on high-income individuals. lo In
short, the 1920s (and the 1930s as well) saw consump tion taxes on the masses and both nominally a nd
decreasingly progressive income taxes on only the rich
and well-to-do, which is what some supporting a va lu e
added tax call for todayll

IV. Symbo lic Progressivity from the 1960s to the
19 80 s: Mellon 's Legacy Lives O n
Four and five decades later, in the 1960s and 19705,
h igh-incom e individuals achieved an effective federa l
in come tax rate of 35 percent as the top ordinary rate
gradually was cut from 90 percent to 70 percent on
unearned income. Sen . Russell Long, D -La., Senate
Finance Committee member and manager of the Senate
floor debate on the Revenue Act of 1964, disclosed in
the 1963 capital gains debate that the vast majority of
very top-bracket individuals (e.g., yearly income of $1
million in 1963 dollars or over $4 million in 1990 dollars)
used the Mellon-originate d capital gains prefere nce (75
percent of their income consisted of capital gains) to
obtain "surprisingly" low effective rates, viz. 22 percen t w h en the top individual ordinary rate wa s still 90
percen t - high-income individuals in g en eral had an
effective rate of around 35 percent.1 2 The individual
capital gains preference during this era was a maximum rate of 25 percent for the large capital gains income and a 50-percen t deduction for the s mall capital

IOKornhauser, "Section 1031: We Don 't Need Another
Hero," 60 So. Ca l. L. Rev. 397 (1987). Professor Kornhaus r,
using a historical research approach, ha s convincingly
hypothesized several factors involved in the enactment of
section 1031 in 1921 and the amendments in 1923 and 1924:
(1) concern about whether capita l gains were income; (2) confusion abou t when realization occurs; (3) sympathy for a consumption theory of income; and (4) economic and political
conditions encouraging an economic policy in the tax laws to
foster investment. Id. at 411, 400, 438-439 (the trick was for
Congress to encourage investment while maintaining
nominally progressive ra tes, which capital gains preference
and tax-free like-kind exchanges accomplished) . The populist
rhetoric in opposition to applying the predecessor of section
1031 to investments including stock strikingly paralleled the
introduction to the Mellon ditty. Rep. John Nance "Cactus
Jack" Garner, D-Tex., explained how Mellon persuaded the
Senate Finance Committee to so extend it: "Why, it happened
just as it always will as long as the Treasury Department has
the viewpoint of taxation that it now has. That will happen
as long as you have a House or a Senate that obeys the mandates of the Treasury Department. It is the viewpoint of those
who desire to relieve the heavy taxpayer from his taxes and
continue the taxes upon the masses of the people, as they have
done in this bill." 61 Congo Rec. 8073 (Part 8) (House Nov. 21,
1921) (Remarks of Rep. Garner, D-Tex.). Th.is was rhetoric as
to the "class" income tax since it did not tax the masses. See
note 2 supra.
llGraetz, "Revisiting the Income Tax vs . Consumption Tax
Debate," 57 Tax Notes 1437, 1440 (Dec. 7, 1992).
12
110 Congo Rec. (Part 2) 1438 (Senate Feb. 1964) (Remarks
of Floor Manager Senator Long).
1395
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gains incomeP The "Surrey Papers"14 pointed out in
1968 that wealthy individuals with large amounts (and
percentages) of capital gains income often achieved
substantially lower effective rates than the 25-percent
alternate maximum capital gains rate by offsetting or
"sheltering" the taxable income remaining after the
50-percent capital gains deduction with other deductions. 1S Assistant Secretary of Treasury Stanley Surrey,
testifying at the end of lame duck President Johnson's
administration in late 1968, revealed that for about 75
percent of the individual taxpayers with over $1 million
in actual annual income, the effective income tax rate
clustered in the area between 20 and 30 percent, compared with about 60 percent of the individual taxpayers with between $20,000 and $50,000 of actual income who clustered in the same effective rate range.
Moreover, while the effective rate increased with actual
income of up to $50,000 and flattened from $50,000 to
$100,000, the effective rates began to decrease above
$1 00,000 in income. 16 He further testified that these
figures did not appear to be a one-shot phenomenon
as to high-income individuals. The capital gains preference constituted the primary reason for these low ef-

13This two-track approach Originated in the Revenue Act
of 1938 with these express targets in mind. Confidential Hearings in H.R. 9682 (Revenue Act of 1938) before the Senate Finance
Comm. (Part 1), 74th Cong., 3d Sess. 11, 15-6 (1938), reprinted
in 22 1909-1950 Legislative Hearings (Statement of Undersecretary of the Treasury Roswell Magill).
14United States Treasury Department, Tax Reform Studies
and Proposals (Parts 1 through 4), 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(Comm. Prnt 1969), reprinted in 22 and 23 Reams Tax Reform
- 1969: A Legis/ative History of the Tax Reform Act of 1969
(William S. Hein & Co. 1991) (1969 Legis/ative History) (prepared in 1968 and published in 1969).
1SSurrey Papers (Part 1), note 14 supra, at 84-86; (Part 2) at
142-45. Therefore, Treasury proposed that nonbusiness
deductions be allocated between taxable and the more common sources of tax-exemp t income and only the former portion be allowed as a deduction. ld. (Part 2) at 145-46. The
other part of the Surrey antishelter package was a minimum
tax on tax preferences. The Surrey Papers computed the minimum tax base by adding back to taxable income (in the order
of revenue importance) (1) one-half of net long-term capital
gain, (2) tax-exempt interest, (3) charitable contributions of
appreciated property, and (4) percentage depletion in excess
of cost depletion. Surrey Papers (Part 1), supra, at 110 (ranking
of items reducing taxes for high-income taxpayers); id. (Part
2), supra, at 136-40 (minimum tax base), reprinted in 22 1969
Legislative History. Surrey proposed a graduated minimum
tax rate of 7 to 35 percent (roughly parallel to half of
graduated rates under the regular rates), limited to a maximum rate of 25 percent in the case of unrealized appreciation
in capital assets taxed at death. ld. (Part 2) at 141-42. Treasury
knew tha t substantially all of the tax preference items
reported by individuals would consist of the long-term capital gains preference (over 80 percent, as it turned out). Thus,
the realized capital gains of wealthy taxpayers would have
been taxed in the 30-percent range rather than in the low
20-percent range.
16Ironicallyand apparently unintentionally, this pattern of
increase and then decline in effective rates was mirrored by
the effective rates by income class produced by the 33-percent
"bubble" under the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
1396

fective ratesY By the early 1980s, high-income in dividuals as a whole (those with at least $200,000 in
annual income) after over a decade of restrictions on
tax shelters, had an effective rate of around 22 percent
when the maximum ordinary rate was 50 p ercent. I S By
the 1980s, tax shelter deductions (principally depreciation and interest deductions as to depreciable real estate) played a much more important role in lower effective rates at the top. In both periods, these effective
rates were averages with 25 percent of the high-income
taxpayers paying an effective rate much closer to the
nominal rates, e.g., 50 to 60 percent in the early 19605,
and 75 percent paying a much lower effective rate than
the average effective rate.
"Cats and dogs" high-income directed deficitreducing tax legislation in 1982, 1984, 1987, and 1990,
together with the 1986 restrictions on tax shelters and
capital gains, recaptured about half of the lost progressivity.19 The effective rate at the top currentl y is about
28 percent.

v.

Progressivity and Clinton Income Tax Proposals

The tax revolt of the American people, sparked by
the passage in a 1978 California referendum of Propos ition 13, was the political foundation for the capital
gains tax cut in 1978 and the top ordinary income and
capital gains cuts in 1981.20 Congressional proponents
of these cuts argued in political debate "that lower
taxes on capital gains will stimula te investment, create
more jobs, broaden the tax base, and increase federal
revenues."21 But Republicans won presidential elections in the 19805 with the key iss ue of painting opponents as tax-and-spend Democrats, which to many
was code for lower taxes on both the uppe r and middle

17Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform (Tax Reform 1969)
before the House Ways and Means Comm. (Part 4), 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 1592, 1598-99 (1969), reprinted in 4 1969 Legislative
History.
1SSee Lee "Entity Classification and Integration: Publicly
Traded Partnerships, Personal Service Corporations and the
Tax Legislative Process," 8 Va. Tax Rev. 57,70-71 n. 43 (1988).
Icrrhe 1986 act's intended increase in corporate effective
rates was thought at the time to restore progressivity (on the
assumption that corporate taxes are borne by capital and not
in part by labor). See Ott, "The Impact of the 1986 Tax Reform
Act on Progressivity," 33 Tax Notes 1223, 1226 (Dec. 29, 1986).
However~ the projected increase in corporate revenues failed
to occur.
20Hearings on H.R. 13511 (Revenue Act of 1978) before the
Senate Finance Committee (Part 4), 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 834
(Remarks of Senate Finance Committee member Roth, RDel.), reprinted in 6 Tax Reform 1978: A Legislative History of
the Revenue Act of 1978 (William S. Hein & Co. 1978); see
generally Dionne, Why Americans Hate Politics 246 (Simon &
Shuster 1991); 34 Congo Q. Almanac 219 (1978); Kaiser & Russel, "A Middle Class Congress - Haves Over Have Nots,"
Washington Post, A-I, col. 3 (Sunday, Oct. 15, 1978).
21124 Congo Rec. (Part 19) 2547 (House Aug. 10, 1978)
(Remarks of Rep. William Steiger, R-Wis.) (sponsor of indexing basis for inflation in addition to traditional 50-percent
deduction); accord, id. at 25428 (Remarks of Rep. Bill Frenzel,
R-Minn.); id. at 25431 (Remarks of Rep. Bill Archer, R-Tex.).
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classes resulting in less government, i.e., less funding
for programs seen as benefitting minorities. 22 This
lower taxes/less federal government/more racism
theme, linked with support of the antiabortion and
cultural "values" key issues of the religious right, constituted the basis for the margin of victory in successful
Republican presidential elections of the 1980s: the core
Republican groups in L.A. Times/Gallup Poll terminology of "Enterprisers" (high-income professionals, business people, etc .) and "Moralists" (religious right,
mostly white southern males) constituting about 25
percent of the electorate, plus "Disaffected Democrats"
(mostly white male Protestant working-class Democrats in the South and white male Catholic/ethnic
working class Democrats in the industrial midwest)
and other conservative independents.
By the end of the 1980s, populist and liberal Democrats began to assert that trickle-down economics had
failed (again)22a - only the rich got richer, the beforetax real income of middle- and lower-income households stagnated or declined. This trend was exacerbated by the tax cuts of 1978 and 1981. The effective
combined federal income and payroll tax rate for the
top declined 25 percent from 1978-1990, while effective
rates for the middle stayed constant and the effective
rate at the bottom rose after taking payroll or Social
Security taxes into account.23 The attack on trickledown economics, dubbed class warfare by proponents
of a renewed capital gains preference, first prevailed
in modem times when President Bush, in pushing (in
the 1990 budget negotiations) a renewed generic capital gains preference primarily benefitting the rich and
at the same time very regressive user and excise taxes
to reduce growth in the federal deficit, opened the door
for the Democrats to paint the Republicans as the party
of the rich. 24 The ultimate triumph of this rhetoric was
the successful 1992 Clinton presidential campaign. The
voters most strongly supporting Clinton were those

22Edsall & Dionne, "Democracy at Work: The Tax Revolt of
the Masses," Washington Post, C-l, col. 4-C-2, col. 4 (Sunday,
Oct. 14, 1990); T. Edsall & M. Edsall, Chain Reaction (W.W.
Norton & Co. 1991); W. Greider, Who Will Tell the People, 88-89,
96-97, 274-75 (Simon & Shuster 1992). See also note 38 infra.
uOKevin Phillips, a leading populist political commentator, demonstrates a pattern in the 18805,19205, and 1980s
of "capitalist booms" in which the principal benefits of the
boom went to the rich and trickled down to the next 10 to 20
percent of Americans (the middle class in the earlier booms),
but petered out below this level with stagnation or a decline
in real disposable per capita income. K. Phillips, Boiling Point
35, 89-92 (Random House 1993). Note that the first two of
these booms were followed by severe depressions or "busts."
ld.

23Even more regressivity arose with increased state and
local taxation - usually in the form of regressive sales or
property taxes and almost flat state income taxes - as federal
revenue sharing was reduced and new state regulation was
federally mandated. E.J. Dionne, note 20 supra, at 319-20.
24130 Cong. Rec. 10285 (House Oct. 16, 1990 Daily Ed.)
(Remarks of Rep. Thomas Downey, D-N.Y.); E.J. Dionne, note
20 supra, at 320.
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who both were concerned about the future economy
and felt that their standard of living was slipping. 25

I

A conservative Republican 's critique
of the president's tax plan on the
basis of populism simply is unfounded
at best and a 'Big Lie' at worst

Clinton charged in the preSidential tel evis ion
"debates" (especially in the third debate), campaign
speeches, and his book/program Putting People First:
A National Economic Strategy for America 26 that 19791990 stagnation in pretax income of the middle 40 percent of households and drop in income of the bottom
40 percent, while the income of the top 20 percent alone
increased (doubling at the top I-percent level), were
due to a failed economic policy: trickle-down economics - "The economic philosophy ... that you
make the economy grow by putting more and more
wealth into the hands of fewer and fewer people at the
top, getting government out of the way, and trusting
them to make the right decisions to invest and to create
jobs."27 Clinton liked to encapsulate this aspect of the
1980s distribution of income in the following "wonkbite" derived from The New York Times. "During the
1980s, the wealthiest one percent of Americans got 70

25Apple, "Clinton, Savoring Victory, Starts Sizing Up Job
Ahead," New York Times A-I, col. 5 (Thursday, Nov. 5, 1992)
(Final late edition); see also Phillips, "The Policies of Frustration," New York Times, section 6, p. 38, col. 2 (Sunday, April
12, 1992); Brownstein, "Divided Economic Vision Blurs
Democratic Outlook; Politics: Strategists See a Renewed Consensus as Vital to Targeting What May Be the Only Chink in
Bush's Armor," Los Angeles Times, A-I, col. 5 (Wednesday,July
3, 1991).
26 For 12 years, the driving idea behind American
economic policy has been cutting taxes on the richest
individuals and corporations and hoping that their
new wealth would "trickle down" to the res t of us.
This policy has failed.
The Republicans in Washington have compiled the
worst economic record in 50 years; the slowest economic growth, slowest job growth, and slowest income
growth since the Great Depression. During the 1980s,
the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans got 70 percent of
income gains. By the end of the decade, American
CEOs were paying themselves 100 times more than
their workers. Washington stood by while quick-buck
artists brought down the savings and loan industry,
leaving the rest of us with a $500 billion bill.
While the rich cashed in, the forgotten middle class
- those people who work hard and play by the rules
- took it on the chin. They worked harder for less
money and paid more taxes to a government that failed
to produce what we need.
Bill Clinton, Putting People First, 1-2 (1992).
27Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton at Montgomery College
Re: Education and Economics, Rockville, MD, electronically
reproduced, 92 NEXIS (Sept. 2, 1992).
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percent of income gains .... The rich got richer, while
the middle class took it on the chin. "28 "And for the
first time since the Roaring '20s, the top one percent of
the American people now control more wealth than the
bottom 90 percent."29 In the third d ebate, Clinton
opened 30 with the assertion that "middle-class
Americans are basically the only group of Americans
who've been taxed more in the 1980s and during the
last 12 years, even though their incomes have gone
down, the wealthiest Americans have been taxed much
less, even though their incomes have gone Up."31 The
1992 Democratic candidate for Vice President, Senator
Al Gore, D-Tenn., declaimed that the rich had taken
from the middle class during the 1980s,32 but Governor
Clinton put it more accurately:
No American would have begrudged ... [the
rich being big winners in the 1980s] since we all
want in this free enterprise system to at least
believe our children might grow up to be rich. No
one would have begrudged that if the rest of us
had been helped. But in 1980 we had the highest

28Id. The source of Clinton's statistic was Nasar, "The 1980s:
A Very Good Time for the Very Rich," New York Times, A-I,
col. 3 (Thursday, March 5, 1992) (top 1 percent earned 60
percent; later CBO corrected unadjusted figure to 70 percent.).
See generally Nasar, "The Richest Getting Richer: Now It's a
Top Political Issue," New York Times, D-1, col. 1 (Monday, May
11, 1992) ("'He [Clinton] was reading the paper that moming
and went crazy: . . . 'The story proved a point he had been
trying to make for months, so he added the statistic to his
repertoire. ''').
29Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton, note 27 supra.
3<7he question asked was whether voters should be concerned whether Clinton's promises (infrastructure, reform
health care, reduce the deficit, and guarantee a college education) could be kept with financial pain only for the rich. Much
later in the debate, Clinton pledged not to raise taxes on the
middle class to pay for (it appeared) investment incentives
(possibly limited to targeted investment tax credit and targeted capital gains), if taxes on the rich and foreign subsidiaries would not pay for such incentives.
31Putting People First, note 26 supra, at 2. Substitution of
lower income for middle income would render Clinton's
statement in the third debate more factually accurate, but less
politically sound. Since the 1970s, Republicans have wooed
the formerly Democratic white lower-middle and working
class (male voters) with the mantra that the tax-and-spend
Democrats exact higher taxes from them to give to the African
Americans. See note 22 supra .
32 That fact that our Nation is in recession is partly
due to the fact that we have had this major change in
the distribution of taxation in this country.

• • •

Middle-income families have seen their real income
go down, a very slight increase in the top 20 percent,
but look at the top 1 percent. Real incomes after taxes
and after inflation adjustment have gone up 136 percent. That is fine if it does not come at the expense of the
rest of the country, but what we have done is we have
increased, more than doubled the income of the top wealthiest
1 percent by taking money away from middle-income
Americans.
(Footnote continued in next column.)
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wages in the world. Now we're 13th. The census
document itself shows that most Americans are
working longer work weeks for lower wages,
paying higher taxes on lower income, paying a
bigger percentage of their income for housing and
for health care, and yes, for education. 33
The Clinton/Gore campaign proposed to raise the
income tax rate on families (hu sband and wife filing
joint return) earning $200,000 or more a year to 36
percent (then 31 percent at this level) with a lO-percent
surtax commencing at the $1 million or more in income.
President Clinton's 1993 tax plan followed these lines,
but lowered the thresholds for the 36-percent bracket
to around $140,000 in family income and for the
"Millionaire's Surtax" to $250,000. This would raise the
effective rate at the top to 33.1 percent. 34 The president's tax plan thus calls for more progressivity, while
the 1920s Mellon tax plan and its modern incarnation
in the Reagan tax cuts in 1981 called for less . A conse rvative 35 Republican'S critique of the president's tax
plan on the basis of populism s imply is unfounded at
best and a "Big Lie" at worst.

(Footnote 32 continued.)
Despite the flip-flop-flip on his "no new taxes"
promise - in an election year confession, admitting he
made a mistake by breaking his promise - George
Bush has not had a conversion. If nothing else, he is
consistent. In this case, consistently pushing for tax
breaks for the rich; more for those who already have
more thanks to a decade of Reagan-Bush economics,
already pay less in taxes. Most Americans cannot pay
their mortgage or afford health care and President Bush
wants to reward those who have the extra cash to
speculate on the stock market. For middle-income
families, George Bush offers warmed-over leftovers and he would make them wait months for them, serving his rich friends first. He still does not get it.
138 Congo Rec. S 3385-86 (Senate March 12, 1992 Daily Ed.)
(Emphasis added); see also id. at H 620-21 (House Feb. 26,
1992 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Rep. Jim Moody, D-Wis., Ways
& Means member) ("The tax bill of 1981 and a number of
subsequent measures produced what has generally been acknowledged to have been the most massive redistribution of
wealth in this Nation.").
33Clinton Remarks re: Educa tion and Economics, note 27
supra. The drop in wages should be limited to drop in manufacturing wages, if services wages, salaries, and profits are
included, the average wages may not have dropped . Farrell,
"In 1992, Country Faces Stark Choice of Philosophies," Boston
Globe, p. 1 (Sunday, Sept. 6, 1992).
34"DSG Cites Misinformation About Reconciliation,
Deficit Reduction Plans," electronically reproduced 93 Tax Notes
Today 109-27 (May 21, 1993).
3sIn the 1992 Congressional Quarterly listing of four interest groups' scoring of votes, Rep. Ewing scored almost 20
percentage points higher than the Republican average (IOO
percent versus 80 percent or so) in the two conservative
groups' ratings and about 12 percentage points below the
Republican average as the liberal interest groups' ratings zero in the case of the ADA. I grew up in working-class
environments in Dayton, Ohio, and the mountains of North
Carolina (including trailer camps, center city tenements, and
mountain shacks). I know populism. Rep . Ewing is no
populist.
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VI. Consumption Taxes
If the Ewing poem was intended as an indictment
of the Clinton tax plan for relying on nonincome taxes,
as the plan does in part, here, too, the use of the poem
is hypocritical. The 1990 budget accord negotiated by
the Bush administration and a handful of congressional
leaders takes the Mellon plan look-alike prize as to
regressive consumption taxes. The Bush administration aided the Democratic redistribution/retribution
for the 1980s camp in the House by (1) negotiating
regressive excise and user taxes 36 as the main revenue
source in the 1990 "parliamen tary" -like budget accord
to meet the challenge of Ways and Means Chairman
Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill., for a $511 billion "reduction"
in the federal deficit over a five-year period, while (2)
providing "growth incentives" for s mall business, including a targeted capital gains preference plus an
upfront deduction for such investmen ts as a lastminute substitute for a generic capital gains deduction.37 A common argument was that this regressive
distribution of the budget accord's burden a mong
lower-, middle-, and high-income individuals would
have continued the Reagan tax policies of the 1980s
under which only the upper-income individuals (and
corporations) had an increase in real income (nearly
100 percent) and a reduction in taxes, both as to
nominal rate and effective rates. This led to the cynical
view that growth and investment rhetoric was a
smokescreen for the Republicans' real agenda - taking

36The administration's directive of no new income taxes inexorably resulted in the September 30, 1990, budget accord
meeting Rostenkowski's $500 billion challenge target largely
through raising "truly regressive" excise taxes (on gas and "sin"
or tobacco and alcohol) and user fees (principally affecting the
elderly, in Medicare premiums) on the revenue side of the agreement. The 1990 budget accord would have increased annual
taxes for (1) the "lower income" (less than $10,000 in taxable
income) by 7.6 percent; (2) the lower "middle income class"
(from $20,000 to $30,000), by 3 percent; (3) the "near rich" (those
making over $100,000), by only 1.9 percent; and (4) the superrich (earning over $500,000 a year), by less than 1 percent.
37Wessel & Birnbaum, "Consolation Prize: Tax Shelters for
Rich Could Return in Plan to Aid Small Business," Wall Street
Journal, A-I, col. 6 and A-18, cols. 1-3 (Tuesday, Oct. 2, 1990).
By far the most expensive of these items would have been
the 25-percent deduction for small-business stock ($7.3 billion over 1991-95 or over 60 percent of the a five-year total
of $11 .5 billion). Indexing and 50-percent deduction each
would have counted for small fraction s of the total estimated
revenue loss (minimum basis or 50-percent deduction, $700
million over the five-year period; indexing $400 million over
five-year period). See Hoerner, "Small Business Incentives:
An Eight-Fold Path to Who Knows Where?," 49 Tax Notes 143
(Oct. 8, 1990). These" growth incentives" were criticized from
the right as too targeted and from the left as creating tax
shelters again. Opponents denounced five months of closeddoor meetings at Andrews Air Force Base between eight congressionalleaders and administration representatives as antidemocratic and providing pork for those members while
calling for "tough choices" by others.
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care of the rich.38 A metaphor frequently used by the
1990 budget accord opponents was tha t the rich were
at the 1980s party, but now they won't have to pay.39
(Interestingly, essentially the same rhetoric was used
by Democratic critics of Mellon's tax cut plan in 1924.4 °)
House Democrats gleefully charged that President
Bush would rather shut down the government than
give up on his plan for granting more ta x breaks to the
rich in the form of a resuscitated capital gains
preference, and that the budget accord's "growth incentives" further rewarded the rich for having made

38 136 Congo Rec. at H 8057 (House Sept. 26, 1990 Daily Ed .)
(Remarks of Rep. Barbara Boxer, D-Cal.). See Edsall & Dionne,
note 22, supra, at C-2, col. 4 ("Republicans, who have never
forgotten their core constituency among the wealthy, have
been disingenuous .... They have talked one game [l ess
government and lower taxes] and played another [income of
middle and lower classes stagnated while income of top 1
percent shot up 87 percent] .").
39 136 Congo Rec. H 8829 (House Oct. 3, 1990 Daily Ed.)
(Remarks of Rep. Major Owens, D-N.Y.); 136 Congo Rec. S
14556-57 (Senate Oct. 4, 1990 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Senator
Patrick Leahy, D-Vt.). Conversely rhetoric characterized the
subsequent House Democrat alternative with an increase in
the top permanent rate to 33 percent as making the rich pay
for the party of the 1980s. 136 CongoRec. H 10117 (House Oct.
16, 1990 Daily Ed .) (Remarks of Rep. Richard Lehman, 0 Cal.); id. at 9940, 9959 (House Oct. 16, 1990 Daily Ed .)
(Remarks of Rep . Jolene Unsoeld, D-Wash.); id. at 10111
(House Oct. 16, 1990 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Rep. Ted Weiss,
D-N.Y.); 136 CongoRec. S 15753-54 (Sena te Oct. 18,1990 Daily
Ed .) (Remarks of Sen. Tom Harkin, D-Iowa) ("We are asking
those who can least afford it to pay for the mess left by the
rich who had the party in the 1980s. I say let us make the rich
pay for their own party they had during the last decade .")
The apparent inspiration for the party metaphor was the S&L
crisis. 136 Congo Rec. H 3599 (House June 14, 1990 Daily Ed .)
(Remarks of Rep. Joseph Kennedy, D-Mass.) (commenting on
CBO estimates of cost of S&L crisis; "[W]hy should the taxpayer[s] have to pay for a party they were never invited to?
It was the wealthy as a class who benefitted from the high
interest rates caused by the S&L feeding frenzy in the
1980s . .. . It is time we stop transferring wealth in this
country from the poor to the rich, it is time to make the
people who had the party pay for it. Let us end this system
of socialism for the rich and free enterprise for the poor." ).
4°65 Congo Rec. (Part 4) 3332-3 (House Feb. 29, 1924)
(Remarks of Rep. Robert Crosser, D-Ohio) (" Ah, my friend s,
the real position of those who argue that it is proper for the
government to cut down by almost a half the tax on big
incomes, on incomes in excess of $92,000 [$708,400 in 1990
dollars], and instead get the money by taxing more the
people with smaller incomes, the real feeling of most men
who want such a plan is that if we increase the wealth of
those financially powerful, those at the top of the economic
structure, enough will dribble down from them to help out
those lower down .. .. During the war [WWI] thousands of
new millionaires were added to those in the United States
prior to the war. The present debt of the government resulted
largely from the war. Is it then unjust that the fabulous incomes of the country should bear a greater proportion of the
expense of the government than the smaller incomes?").
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more money in the 1980s than ever before . They
declaimed that Reagan's 1981 "riverboat gamble"41 of
reducing taxes at th e top, including a cut in the maximum individual capital gains rate to 20 pe rcent (while
increasing defense spending), had tripled the deficit
rather than reaching a balanced budget as promised,
and had benefitted only the highest-income individuals. Of course, Bill Clinton successfully ran for
president in 1992 on precisely this populist theme.

In conclusion, I find Rep. Ewing's "populist" humor
about as hypocritical as President George He rbert
Walker Bush's comparison of himself, in ve toing the
first 1992 tax bill, to President H a rry Truman vetoing
the 1948 tax bills. Bush's 1992 vetoes were sus tained
by the "Conservative Coalition" of Republicans and
conservative (largely Southern) Democrats. 42 Truman 's
1948 vetoes of tax legislation were ove rridden by the
self-same Conservative Coalition.

41See 136 Congo Ree. H 9115 (House Oct. 6, 1990 Daily Ed.)
(Remarks of Rep. David Obey, D-Wis.) (then-Senate Republican floor leader Howard Baker, R-Tenn., called President
Reagan's 1981 tax a "riverboat gamble," a w ager that Obey
had not m ade.).

42For a discussion of the political science concept of "conservative coalition" see Lee, " Presiden t Clin ton's Capital Gain
Proposals," 59 Tax Notes 1399, 1402 and n. 10 Uune 7, 1993).
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